Initial commit

package/network/services/hostapd/patches/064-0012-EAP-pwd-server-Detect-reflection-attacks.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From d63edfa90243e9a7de6ae5c275032f2cc79fef95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 17:26:01 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 12/14] EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
+
+When processing an EAP-pwd Commit frame, verify that the peer's scalar
+and elliptic curve element differ from the one sent by the server. This
+prevents reflection attacks where the adversary reflects the scalar and
+element sent by the server. (CVE-2019-9497)
+
+The vulnerability allows an adversary to complete the EAP-pwd handshake
+as any user. However, the adversary does not learn the negotiated
+session key, meaning the subsequent 4-way handshake would fail. As a
+result, this cannot be abused to bypass authentication unless EAP-pwd is
+used in non-WLAN cases without any following key exchange that would
+require the attacker to learn the MSK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanhoef@nyu.edu>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -688,6 +688,15 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_s
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* detect reflection attacks */
++	if (crypto_bignum_cmp(data->my_scalar, data->peer_scalar) == 0 ||
++	    crypto_ec_point_cmp(data->grp->group, data->my_element,
++				data->peer_element) == 0) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++			   "EAP-PWD (server): detected reflection attack!");
++		goto fin;
++	}
++
+ 	/* compute the shared key, k */
+ 	if ((crypto_ec_point_mul(data->grp->group, data->grp->pwe,
+ 				 data->peer_scalar, K) < 0) ||