Initial commit

package/network/utils/curl/patches/200-no_docs_tests.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ CLEANFILES = $(VC6_LIBDSP) $(VC6_SRCDSP)
+ bin_SCRIPTS = curl-config
+ 
+ SUBDIRS = lib src
+-DIST_SUBDIRS = $(SUBDIRS) tests packages scripts include docs
++DIST_SUBDIRS = $(SUBDIRS) packages include
+ 
+ pkgconfigdir = $(libdir)/pkgconfig
+ pkgconfig_DATA = libcurl.pc
+@@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ cygwinbin:
+ # We extend the standard install with a custom hook:
+ install-data-hook:
+ 	cd include && $(MAKE) install
+-	cd docs && $(MAKE) install
+-	cd docs/libcurl && $(MAKE) install
++	#cd docs && $(MAKE) install
++	#cd docs/libcurl && $(MAKE) install
+ 
+ # We extend the standard uninstall with a custom hook:
+ uninstall-hook:

package/network/utils/curl/patches/310-mbedtls-disable-runtime-version-check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
++++ b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c
+@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static void Curl_mbedtls_session_free(vo
+ 
+ static size_t Curl_mbedtls_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
+ {
+-  unsigned int version = mbedtls_version_get_number();
++  unsigned int version = MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER;
+   return snprintf(buffer, size, "mbedTLS/%u.%u.%u", version>>24,
+                   (version>>16)&0xff, (version>>8)&0xff);
+ }

package/network/utils/curl/patches/400-CVE-2018-0500.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From ba1dbd78e5f1ed67c1b8d37ac89d90e5e330b628 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 12:24:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
+
+... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
+a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
+
+Reported-by: Peter Wu
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
+---
+ lib/smtp.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -1563,13 +1563,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct con
+   if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) {
+     oldscratch = scratch;
+ 
+-    scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * data->set.buffer_size);
++    scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * UPLOAD_BUFSIZE);
+     if(!newscratch) {
+       failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer!");
+ 
+       return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+     }
+   }
++  DEBUGASSERT(UPLOAD_BUFSIZE >= nread);
+ 
+   /* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */
+   eob_sent = smtp->eob;

package/network/utils/curl/patches/401-CVE-2018-14618.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 57d299a499155d4b327e341c6024e293b0418243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 10:35:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash: return error on too long password
+
+... since it would cause an integer overflow if longer than (max size_t
+/ 2).
+
+This is CVE-2018-14618
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-14618.html
+Closes #2756
+Reported-by: Zhaoyang Wu
+---
+ lib/curl_ntlm_core.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
++++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
+@@ -557,8 +557,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_nt_hash(struc
+                                    unsigned char *ntbuffer /* 21 bytes */)
+ {
+   size_t len = strlen(password);
+-  unsigned char *pw = len ? malloc(len * 2) : strdup("");
++  unsigned char *pw;
+   CURLcode result;
++  if(len > SIZE_T_MAX/2) /* avoid integer overflow */
++    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
++  pw = len ? malloc(len * 2) : strdup("");
+   if(!pw)
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 

package/network/utils/curl/patches/402-CVE-2018-16839.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+From f3a24d7916b9173c69a3e0ee790102993833d6c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2018 16:08:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Curl_auth_create_plain_message: fix too-large-input-check
+
+CVE-2018-16839
+Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16839.html
+---
+ lib/vauth/cleartext.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/cleartext.c
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_plain_message(
+   plen = strlen(passwdp);
+ 
+   /* Compute binary message length. Check for overflows. */
+-  if((ulen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2)))
++  if((ulen > SIZE_T_MAX/4) || (plen > (SIZE_T_MAX/2 - 2)))
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+   plainlen = 2 * ulen + plen + 2;
+ 

package/network/utils/curl/patches/403-CVE-2018-16840.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 81d135d67155c5295b1033679c606165d4e28f3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2018 15:07:15 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid
+ use-after-free
+
+Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
+CVE-2018-16840
+Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
+---
+ lib/url.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/lib/url.c
++++ b/lib/url.c
+@@ -320,10 +320,12 @@ CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *da
+        and detach this handle from there. */
+     curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
+ 
+-  if(data->multi_easy)
++  if(data->multi_easy) {
+     /* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
+        use and this is the one */
+     curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
++    data->multi_easy = NULL;
++  }
+ 
+   /* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
+      /normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in

package/network/utils/curl/patches/404-CVE-2018-16842.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+From d530e92f59ae9bb2d47066c3c460b25d2ffeb211 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 01:33:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] voutf: fix bad arethmetic when outputting warnings to stderr
+
+CVE-2018-16842
+Reported-by: Brian Carpenter
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16842.html
+---
+ src/tool_msgs.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/tool_msgs.c
++++ b/src/tool_msgs.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static void voutf(struct GlobalConfig *c
+         (void)fwrite(ptr, cut + 1, 1, config->errors);
+         fputs("\n", config->errors);
+         ptr += cut + 1; /* skip the space too */
+-        len -= cut;
++        len -= cut + 1;
+       }
+       else {
+         fputs(ptr, config->errors);

package/network/utils/curl/patches/405-CVE-2019-3823.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 39df4073e5413fcdbb5a38da0c1ce6f1c0ceb484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
+Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol
+
+If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination
+after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line
+buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are
+using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack.
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3823.html
+Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
+CVE-2019-3823
+---
+ lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+  *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+  *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+  *
+- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+  *
+  * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+  * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+@@ -207,8 +207,12 @@ static bool smtp_endofresp(struct connec
+      Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and
+      only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */
+   if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) {
++    char tmpline[6];
++
+     result = TRUE;
+-    *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10));
++    memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline));
++    memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3));
++    *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10));
+ 
+     /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */
+     if(*resp == 1)

package/network/utils/curl/patches/406-CVE-2019-3822.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
+Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
+CVE-2019-3822
+---
+ lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+@@ -776,11 +776,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_mes
+   });
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
+-  if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
+-    DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
+-    memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
+-    size += ntresplen;
++  /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
++  if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
++    failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
++    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+   }
++  DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
++  memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
++  size += ntresplen;
+ 
+   DEBUG_OUT({
+     fprintf(stderr, "\n   ntresp=");

package/network/utils/curl/patches/407-CVE-2018-16890.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From b780b30d1377adb10bbe774835f49e9b237fb9bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 20:33:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] NTLM: fix size check condition for type2 received data
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16890.html
+Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
+CVE-2018-16890
+---
+ lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
+  *                            | (__| |_| |  _ <| |___
+  *                             \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+  *
+- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+  *
+  * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+  * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+@@ -182,10 +182,11 @@ static CURLcode ntlm_decode_type2_target
+     target_info_len = Curl_read16_le(&buffer[40]);
+     target_info_offset = Curl_read32_le(&buffer[44]);
+     if(target_info_len > 0) {
+-      if(((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
++      if((target_info_offset >= size) ||
++         ((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
+          (target_info_offset < 48)) {
+         infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (bad type-2 message). "
+-                    "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
++              "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
+         return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
+       }
+