Initial commit

tools/patch/patches/010-CVE-2018-6951.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+From 1f7853c05f9949d81da9be7a02b90cc64284d1f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 16:48:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix segfault with mangled rename patch
+
+http://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?53132
+* src/pch.c (intuit_diff_type): Ensure that two filenames are specified
+for renames and copies (fix the existing check).
+---
+ src/pch.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -974,7 +974,8 @@ intuit_diff_type (bool need_header, mode
+     if ((pch_rename () || pch_copy ())
+ 	&& ! inname
+ 	&& ! ((i == OLD || i == NEW) &&
+-	      p_name[! reverse] &&
++	      p_name[reverse] && p_name[! reverse] &&
++	      name_is_valid (p_name[reverse]) &&
+ 	      name_is_valid (p_name[! reverse])))
+       {
+ 	say ("Cannot %s file without two valid file names\n", pch_rename () ? "rename" : "copy");

tools/patch/patches/020-CVE-2018-1000156.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+From b3a0ca3deed00334f9feece43f76776b6a168e47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 12:14:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches
+ (CVE-2018-1000156)
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Write ed script to a temporary file instead
+of piping it to ed: this will cause ed to abort on invalid commands
+instead of rejecting them and carrying on.
+* tests/ed-style: New test case.
+* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add test case.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ # include <io.h>
+ #endif
+ #include <safe.h>
++#include <sys/wait.h>
+ 
+ #define INITHUNKMAX 125			/* initial dynamic allocation size */
+ 
+@@ -2389,22 +2390,28 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+     static char const editor_program[] = EDITOR_PROGRAM;
+ 
+     file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
+-    FILE *pipefp = 0;
+     size_t chars_read;
++    FILE *tmpfp = 0;
++    char const *tmpname;
++    int tmpfd;
++    pid_t pid;
++
++    if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch)
++      {
++	/* Write ed script to a temporary file.  This causes ed to abort on
++	   invalid commands such as when line numbers or ranges exceed the
++	   number of available lines.  When ed reads from a pipe, it rejects
++	   invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which
++	   can lead to arbitrary command execution.  */
++
++	tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
++	if (tmpfd == -1)
++	  pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
++	tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b");
++	if (! tmpfp)
++	  pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
++      }
+ 
+-    if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
+-	int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
+-	assert (! inerrno);
+-	*outname_needs_removal = true;
+-	copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+-	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+-		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+-		 outname);
+-	fflush (stdout);
+-	pipefp = popen(buf, binary_transput ? "wb" : "w");
+-	if (!pipefp)
+-	  pfatal ("Can't open pipe to %s", quotearg (buf));
+-    }
+     for (;;) {
+ 	char ed_command_letter;
+ 	beginning_of_this_line = file_tell (pfp);
+@@ -2415,14 +2422,14 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ 	}
+ 	ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (buf);
+ 	if (ed_command_letter) {
+-	    if (pipefp)
+-		if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
++	    if (tmpfp)
++		if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
+ 		    write_fatal ();
+ 	    if (ed_command_letter != 'd' && ed_command_letter != 's') {
+ 	        p_pass_comments_through = true;
+ 		while ((chars_read = get_line ()) != 0) {
+-		    if (pipefp)
+-			if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
++		    if (tmpfp)
++			if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
+ 			    write_fatal ();
+ 		    if (chars_read == 2  &&  strEQ (buf, ".\n"))
+ 			break;
+@@ -2435,13 +2442,49 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ 	    break;
+ 	}
+     }
+-    if (!pipefp)
++    if (!tmpfp)
+       return;
+-    if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, pipefp) == 0
+-	|| fflush (pipefp) != 0)
++    if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, tmpfp) == 0
++	|| fflush (tmpfp) != 0)
+       write_fatal ();
+-    if (pclose (pipefp) != 0)
+-      fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
++
++    if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
++      pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
++
++    if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
++	int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
++	*outname_needs_removal = true;
++	if (inerrno != ENOENT)
++	  {
++	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
++	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
++	  }
++	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
++		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
++		 outname);
++	fflush (stdout);
++
++	pid = fork();
++	if (pid == -1)
++	  pfatal ("Can't fork");
++	else if (pid == 0)
++	  {
++	    dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
++	    execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++	    _exit (2);
++	  }
++	else
++	  {
++	    int wstatus;
++	    if (waitpid (pid, &wstatus, 0) == -1
++	        || ! WIFEXITED (wstatus)
++		|| WEXITSTATUS (wstatus) != 0)
++	      fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
++	  }
++    }
++
++    fclose (tmpfp);
++    safe_unlink (tmpname);
+ 
+     if (ofp)
+       {

tools/patch/patches/030-CVE-2018-6952.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+From df40f2ea17254de269a3624319a12a93a4e395ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2018 13:35:40 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix swapping fake lines in pch_swap
+
+* src/pch.c (pch_swap): Fix swapping p_bfake and p_efake when there is a
+blank line in the middle of a context-diff hunk: that empty line stays
+in the middle of the hunk and isn't swapped.
+
+Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/index.php?53133
+---
+ src/pch.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ pch_swap (void)
+     }
+     if (p_efake >= 0) {			/* fix non-freeable ptr range */
+ 	if (p_efake <= i)
+-	    n = p_end - i + 1;
++	    n = p_end - p_ptrn_lines;
+ 	else
+ 	    n = -i;
+ 	p_efake += n;

tools/patch/patches/040-Fix-error-handling-with-git-style-patches.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 424da221cec76ea200cff1fa9b08a6f3d94c28a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
+Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 16:39:13 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix error handling with git-style patches
+
+When an error is encountered in output_files(), the subsequent call to
+cleanup() calls back into output_files() resulting in an infinte recursion.
+This is trivially reproduced with a git-style patch (which utilizes
+output_file_later()) that tries to patch a nonexistent or unreadable
+file (see attached test case).
+
+* src/patch.c: (output_files) clear the files_to_output list before
+iterating it, so that recursive calls won't iterate the same files.
+---
+ src/patch.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/patch.c
++++ b/src/patch.c
+@@ -1938,8 +1938,12 @@ output_files (struct stat const *st)
+ {
+   gl_list_iterator_t iter;
+   const void *elt;
++  gl_list_t files;
+ 
+-  iter = gl_list_iterator (files_to_output);
++  files = files_to_output;
++  init_files_to_output ();
++
++  iter = gl_list_iterator (files);
+   while (gl_list_iterator_next (&iter, &elt, NULL))
+     {
+       const struct file_to_output *file_to_output = elt;
+@@ -1957,8 +1961,8 @@ output_files (struct stat const *st)
+ 	  /* Free the list up to here. */
+ 	  for (;;)
+ 	    {
+-	      const void *elt2 = gl_list_get_at (files_to_output, 0);
+-	      gl_list_remove_at (files_to_output, 0);
++	      const void *elt2 = gl_list_get_at (files, 0);
++	      gl_list_remove_at (files, 0);
+ 	      if (elt == elt2)
+ 		break;
+ 	    }
+@@ -1967,7 +1971,7 @@ output_files (struct stat const *st)
+ 	}
+     }
+   gl_list_iterator_free (&iter);
+-  gl_list_clear (files_to_output);
++  gl_list_clear (files);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Fatal exit with cleanup. */

tools/patch/patches/050-CVE-2019-13636.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+From dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 16:21:48 +0200
+Subject: Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
+
+* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
+append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
+the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks.  So far, we were only doing
+that consistently for input files.
+* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
+with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well.
+---
+ src/inp.c  | 12 ++++++++++--
+ src/util.c | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/inp.c
++++ b/src/inp.c
+@@ -238,8 +238,13 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+     {
+       if (S_ISREG (instat.st_mode))
+         {
+-	  int ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY|binary_transput, 0);
++	  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+ 	  size_t buffered = 0, n;
++	  int ifd;
++
++	  if (! follow_symlinks)
++	    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++	  ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0);
+ 	  if (ifd < 0)
+ 	    pfatal ("can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+ 
+@@ -340,6 +345,7 @@ plan_a (char const *filename)
+ static void
+ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ {
++  int flags = O_RDONLY | binary_transput;
+   int ifd;
+   FILE *ifp;
+   int c;
+@@ -353,7 +359,9 @@ plan_b (char const *filename)
+ 
+   if (instat.st_size == 0)
+     filename = NULL_DEVICE;
+-  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, O_RDONLY | binary_transput, 0)) < 0
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((ifd = safe_open (filename, flags, 0)) < 0
+       || ! (ifp = fdopen (ifd, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r")))
+     pfatal ("Can't open file %s", quotearg (filename));
+   if (TMPINNAME_needs_removal)
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ create_backup (char const *to, const str
+ 
+ 	  try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
+ 	  safe_unlink (bakname);
+-	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
++	  while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
+ 		pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
+@@ -579,10 +579,13 @@ create_file (char const *file, int open_
+ static void
+ copy_to_fd (const char *from, int tofd)
+ {
++  int from_flags = O_RDONLY | O_BINARY;
+   int fromfd;
+   ssize_t i;
+ 
+-  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    from_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((fromfd = safe_open (from, from_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (from));
+   while ((i = read (fromfd, buf, bufsize)) != 0)
+     {
+@@ -625,6 +628,8 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const
+   else
+     {
+       assert (S_ISREG (mode));
++      if (! follow_symlinks)
++	to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+       tofd = create_file (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | to_flags, mode,
+ 			  to_dir_known_to_exist);
+       copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+@@ -640,9 +645,12 @@ copy_file (char const *from, char const
+ void
+ append_to_file (char const *from, char const *to)
+ {
++  int to_flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_BINARY;
+   int tofd;
+ 
+-  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, O_WRONLY | O_BINARY | O_APPEND, 0)) < 0)
++  if (! follow_symlinks)
++    to_flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
++  if ((tofd = safe_open (to, to_flags, 0)) < 0)
+     pfatal ("Can't reopen file %s", quotearg (to));
+   copy_to_fd (from, tofd);
+   if (close (tofd) != 0)

tools/patch/patches/060-CVE-2019-13638.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 3fcd042d26d70856e826a42b5f93dc4854d80bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 19:36:15 +0200
+Subject: Invoke ed directly instead of using the shell
+
+* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Invoke ed directly instead of using a shell
+command to avoid quoting vulnerabilities.
+---
+ src/pch.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/pch.c
++++ b/src/pch.c
+@@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ 	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
+ 	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
+ 	  }
+-	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
+-		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
+-		 outname);
+ 	fflush (stdout);
+ 
+ 	pid = fork();
+@@ -2470,7 +2467,8 @@ do_ed_script (char const *inname, char c
+ 	else if (pid == 0)
+ 	  {
+ 	    dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
+-	    execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
++	    assert (outname[0] != '!' && outname[0] != '-');
++	    execlp (editor_program, editor_program, "-", outname, (char  *) NULL);
+ 	    _exit (2);
+ 	  }
+ 	else

tools/patch/patches/070-don-t-fail-hard-on-EACCES-when-copying-xattrs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From f42cbe1a91a3a6f79d1eec594ce7c72aec79179b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Thomas=20Wei=C3=9Fschuh?= <thomas@t-8ch.de>
+Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 05:08:22 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] don't fail hard on EACCES when copying xattrs
+
+On btrfs the xattr "btrfs.compressed" requires privileges to set,
+otherwise EACCES is returned.
+When patch tries to do copy this attribute it receives the error and
+aborts.
+---
+ src/util.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/util.c
++++ b/src/util.c
+@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ copy_attr_error (struct error_context *c
+   int err = errno;
+   va_list ap;
+ 
+-  if (err != ENOSYS && err != ENOTSUP && err != EPERM)
++  if (err != ENOSYS && err != ENOTSUP && err != EPERM && err != EACCES)
+     {
+       /* use verror module to print error message */
+       va_start (ap, fmt);
+@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ set_file_attributes (char const *to, enu
+     }
+   if (attr & FA_XATTRS)
+     if (copy_attr (from, to) != 0
+-	&& errno != ENOSYS && errno != ENOTSUP && errno != EPERM)
++	&& errno != ENOSYS && errno != ENOTSUP && errno != EPERM && errno != EACCES)
+       fatal_exit (0);
+   if (attr & FA_MODE)
+     {